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 2
Quantifying alert override has been the focus of much research in health informatics, 
with override rate traditionally viewed as a surrogate inverse indicator for alert 
effectiveness. However, relying on alert override to assess computerized alerts 
assumes that alerts are being read and determined to be irrelevant by users. Our 
research suggests that this is unlikely to be the case when users are experiencing alert 
overload. We propose that over time, alert override becomes habitual. The override 
response is activated by environmental cues and repeated automatically, with limited 
conscious intention. In this paper we outline this new perspective on understanding 
alert override. We present evidence consistent with the notion of alert override as a 
habitual behaviour and discuss implications of this novel perspective for future 
research on alert override, a common and persistent problem accompanying decision 
support system implementation.   
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 3
Alert or alarm overload represents a persistent problem for users, implementers and 
designers in a range of industries. Offshore oil control room operators are often over-
alerted about potential failures in components of the system,[1] and processing plant 
operators experience ‘alarm floods’, large quantities of alarms signalling plant 
disturbances (e.g. pressure, temperature).[2] In healthcare, alert overload has become 
an increasingly significant problem as clinical information systems become more 
widespread and sophisticated. This is not a new problem – a 1969 report describes 
users becoming ‘frustrated’ by the hospital information system’s continuous 
feedback.[3] In this paper, we focus on alerts embedded in electronic prescribing 
systems (ePS) or Computerized Provider Order Entry (CPOE) systems. These alerts 
are triggered at the point of prescribing and are designed to warn doctors about 
possible errors in orders, such as patient allergies, inappropriate doses, or drug-drug 
interactions (DDIs).  
 
‘Alert fatigue’, the operator mental state resulting from alert overload, is a frequent 
unintended consequence of clinical decision support implementation.[4] Alert fatigue 
describes users becoming overwhelmed and desensitised to alert presentation.[5,6] A 
perceived consequence of alert fatigue is alert override: users move past the alert 
screen or box without cancelling or making a change to an order in response to the 
information contained in the alert. For example, to override the alert in Figure 1, the 
user clicks ‘Override’, and in Figure 2, the user clicks ‘Keep Current Order’. Users 
are sometimes required to provide a reason for overriding an alert, either by selecting 
a reason from a drop-down list, or entering a free text reason, as in Figures 1 and 2. 
Quantifying alert override has been the focus of much research in health informatics, 
Page 3 of 15
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jamia
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Confidential: For Review Only
 4
with studies showing that doctors override computerized alerts in ePS/CPOE up to 
95% of the time.[7-10]  
[Figure 1 here] 
[Figure 2 here] 
Research evaluating alert effectiveness has largely comprised of assessments of alert 
overrides, with override rate traditionally viewed as a surrogate inverse indicator for 
alert effectiveness. If an alert is frequently overridden, then it naturally follows that 
the alert is not providing prescribers with useful or relevant information. For example, 
in a study that aimed to identify non-critical DDIs that would not need to be presented 
to users as an interruptive alert, an analysis of alert data was performed and all DDI 
alerts that were overridden more than 90% of the time were presented to an expert 
panel for discussion as potentially of limited value.[11] More recently, researchers 
have cautioned against using override rates as a means of assessing alert 
effectiveness.[12,13] This is primarily because an override rate does not tell the full 
story about an alert’s impact on prescribing behaviours (e.g. changes that are made to 
prescriptions long after the alert is triggered and clicked past). In a study that used 
field observations and interviews with prescribers to explore prescriber-alert 
interactions, it was discovered that some alerts that were overridden were still useful 
as they prompted prescribers to discuss information with patients.[14] This positive 
effect would not have been captured if alert override rate had been used as the only 
indicator of effectiveness.  
 
Relying on alert override rate to assess computerized alerts also assumes that alerts 
are being read and determined to be irrelevant by users. Our research suggests that 
this is unlikely to be the case when users are experiencing alert overload.[15] We 
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shadowed teams of doctors as they prescribed medications on ward-rounds using an 
ePS and observed a very large number of alerts being triggered (approximately half 
the medication orders triggered one or more alerts). We noticed that prescribers not 
only overrode most of the alerts triggered, but rarely read the alert content.[15] If 
users are not overriding an alert based only on an assessment of its relevance, then 
some additional driver for alert override must be at play. We suggest that over time, 
alert override becomes habitual; this behaviour is activated by environmental cues and 
repeated automatically, without conscious intention. 
 
Alert override as a habit 
A large amount of human behaviour occurs automatically, with limited awareness. 
Habits are “learned sequences of acts that have become automatic responses to 
specific cues and are functional in obtaining certain goals or end-states”.[16] Habits 
are formed by establishing an association between an environmental cue(s), a 
response, and its consequences.[17] For habits to form, the context must be stable, the 
behaviour must be repeated frequently and the outcome of the behaviour must be 
reinforcing (i.e. satisfying).[18] In Table 1, we consider the three antecedents to habit 
formation in the context of alert override. 
  
Table 1. Alert override and the three antecedents to habit formation 
Required antecedents to habit 
formation 
Relevance to alert override 
Stable context Alert override occurs on presentation of a 
computerized alert, which occurs when doctors 
are using a ePS/CPOE to prescribe medications 
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Frequent behaviour  Alerts are overridden regularly and frequently 
Positive outcome/reinforcement Overriding an alert allows the prescriber to 
proceed with their medication order and is not 
accompanied by an immediate negative 
consequence 
 
Although behaviours are initially carried out consciously, over time, as behaviours are 
performed repeatedly, they become habitual and begin to be performed automatically. 
A key characteristic of habit is automaticity. Habits are performed efficiently, with 
limited awareness.[16,19] We perform many behaviours (e.g. driving a car) without 
being aware of making discrete decisions along the way (e.g. to indicate when 
turning). We also perform many behaviours with little mental effort, under conditions 
of high workload, time pressure and information overload. Once a habit is formed, it 
is the context or a specific cue in the environment that activates the automated 
behaviour. And when a habit is strong, the user is less likely to consider contextual 
information, less likely to search for new information, and less likely to contemplate 
alternative courses of action.[16] 
 
We apply this notion to alert presentation and override. When a prescriber encounters 
an alert for the first time, they are likely to read the alert content, and if not relevant, 
override the alert to proceed with their prescription. We suggest that over time, as 
prescribers encounter more irrelevant or predictable alerts, and override more alerts, 
the override response becomes habitual. When an alert is presented, it acts as a cue 
and automatically triggers the override response. Under conditions of alert overload, 
alert override is no longer driven by a conscious decision to act. Prescribers 
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automatically override the alert with little attention given to the alert content or its 
relevance to the patient.  
 
Evidence for alert override as a habit 
The health informatics literature provides us with several interesting findings that are 
consistent with the idea that alert override represents a habitual response. Results 
from numerous studies have shown that users may not be reading alert content when a 
computerized alert is presented. For example, a detailed retrospective review of alerts 
triggered by physicians over a four-day period at two US primary teaching hospitals 
showed that even highly relevant alerts (e.g. exact allergy matches) were frequently 
overridden.[8] In a study where alert content was modified to include more relevant 
patient information, little impact on override rates was observed, suggesting that users 
could potentially have not noticed this improved specificity.[20] Similarly, in a study 
that examined nearly 15,000 overrides across 36 US primary practices, it was shown 
that users continued to override important and useful alerts, despite modifications to 
the system so that more meaningful alerts were presented.[21] Overall, these findings 
are compatible with the theory that users may not be attending to the alert content 
before performing an override response. 
 
Evidence for alerts not being read also comes from the unfortunate circumstance 
where safety-critical alerts are overridden and the result is a medication error and 
subsequent patient harm - alert fatigue is often cited as the cause.[22,23] 
 
Further evidence which points to habit formation as a possible mechanism for alert 
override is found in studies investigating the reasons recorded by doctors for 
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overriding an alert. Doctors are unlikely to enter an override reason into an electronic 
system if it is not a requirement to do so,[24,25] and when a reason is provided, it is 
not always useful or appropriate.[8,25] A US study reviewing nearly 500 DDI alert 
overrides and accompanying patient charts found that although two thirds of the 
overrides were considered appropriate, less than two thirds of the override reasons 
selected by doctors from a drop-down list (e.g. ‘will monitor as recommended’) 
reflected actions that were actually carried out.[21] The authors suggested that some 
providers were selecting override reasons at random in order to proceed with the 
order.[21] 
 
Studies investigating prescriber responses to alerts over time are lacking. In one study 
that examined clinician responses to clinical trial alerts in an electronic medical 
record, responses decreased over a 36-week exposure period (dropping 2.7% per 2-
week period).[6] A review of over 3 million prescriptions across 863 US practices 
revealed that clinicians who wrote more electronic prescriptions were more likely to 
override alerts than clinicians who wrote fewer prescriptions (p<0.001).[26] 
Similarly, a review of responses to best-practice alerts over a three-year period in a 
health network in New York showed that for every additional 100 alerts received by a 
provider, override rate increased by 1%.[27] In this setting, there was also a negative 
association between frequency of drug alerts and alert acceptance.[27] These findings 
collectively suggest that alert content may not be the only driver for alert override. An 
alternative mechanism, one that develops over time with increased exposure to alerts, 
may be contributing to the override response. We propose that this is habit formation. 
  
Page 8 of 15
https://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/jamia
Journal of the American Medical Informatics Association
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Confidential: For Review Only
 9
Several strategies have been proposed and evaluated for improving alert effectiveness, 
such as customizing alerts for clinicians,[26] increasing alert specificity,[28] tiering 
alerts and presenting only high level (severe) alerts to clinicians,[29], and improving 
alert interface design.[30] These strategies are not dissimilar to those adopted in other 
industries (e.g. process industries), where alarm management has focused on reducing 
the number and improving the quality and clarity of alarms presented.[31] These 
strategies are also consistent with a habit development framework, as they target one 
or more of the three antecedents of habit formation. Approaches that reduce the 
number of alerts being presented also reduce the number of times a clinician overrides 
an alert, thus lessening the ‘frequent behaviour’. Strategies that make alerts more 
distinguishable from one another disrupt the ‘stable context’, and those that result in 
more relevant alerts being presented attenuate the ‘positive reinforcement’. 
Overriding alerts that are irrelevant is satisfying and is thus likely to foster habit 
formation. Overriding alerts that are highly relevant is not satisfying, as this action is 
likely to lead to patient harm. 
 
Implications of habit development and future research 
In viewing alert override as an overlearned response, future research on alerts in 
ePS/CPOE should focus on examining behaviours, rather than intentions. Reasoned 
action models, like the theory of planned behaviour,[32] might not be the most useful 
theoretical foundations for studying and understanding user responses to alerts, 
particularly when users are experiencing alert overload. These theories propose that 
attitudes, intentions and norms guide future behaviour. Although these factors are 
highly relevant to habit development, once a habit is well-established, measures of 
past behavioural frequency are likely to contribute to the prediction of future 
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behaviour more than measures contained in these theories.[16] Surveys and 
interviews will thus not give us useful information about alert override as it takes 
place outside a user’s consciousness. Observational methods would be much more 
valuable.  
 
Further research is needed to demonstrate the automaticity of alert override: the speed 
at which the response occurs, and the user’s knowledge of the alert content. 
Interestingly, no research to date has systematically investigated the impact of alert 
rate on alert override. If alert override is a habitual response, how much exposure to 
the cue-response-consequence (alert-override-continue order) environment is needed 
before a habit is formed? To date, no association between number of alerts 
experienced and override rates has been shown, but this is most likely because only a 
small number of studies have explored this relationship.[7] How do we stop users 
from overriding alerts once an override habit is formed? How do we get users to read 
and consider alert content again? Interventions aimed at changing beliefs or attitudes 
are unlikely to be effective in changing habitual behaviours and lack of attention to 
new information make habits very hard to break.[16] Strategies that target one or 
more of the antecedents to habit formation (i.e. frequent behaviour, stable context and 
positive reinforcement) are most likely to be successful.  
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Figure 1. An example of a drug-order duplication alert 
Figure 2. An example of a drug allergy alert 
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Figure 2. An example of a drug allergy alert  
27x14mm (300 x 300 DPI)  
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